We develop a model to study the effects of migration and remittances on inequality in the origin communities. While wealth inequality is shown to be monotonically reduced along the time-span, the short-and the long-run impacts on income inequality may be of opposite signs, suggesting that the dynamic relationship between migration/remittances and inequality may well be characterized by an inverse U-shaped pattern. This is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature, yet offers a different interpretation from the usually assumed migration network effects. With no need to endogenize migration costs through the role of migration networks, we generate the same results via intergenerational wealth accumulation.
Introduction
Does international migration increase or decrease economic inequality in developing (sending) countries? What are the possible forces that may decide whether there exists a positive or a negative relationship between the two? These are important issues because inequality is an outcome of interest in its own right and because the distribution of income conditions the extent to which liquidity constraints impinge on investment in physical and human capital. 1 Consequently, the growth-enhancing potential of international migration largely depends on its distributional impact.
A series of recent studies covering a large sample of developing countries have demonstrated the growth potential of migration in a context of capital market imperfections, with remittances and savings accumulated abroad relaxing credit constraints on farm investment [15, 29] , education [9, 12] and investment in micro-enterprises. The latter channel is particularly important because it emphasizes the potential for migration and remittances to affect inequality not only through the direct effect on income but also by impacting on occupational choices (e.g., by easing access to selfemployment and entrepreneurship), which can in turn affect inequality through the induced labor market adjustments. This was demonstrated first in Mesnard [19, 20] and Rapoport [26] , who extended Banerjee and Newman [5] for migration. 2 The basic idea is that when access to self-employment is liquidity-constrained, agents may opt for temporary migration to overcome credit market imperfections at home and adopt optimal savings and migration duration strategies accordingly [21] . This is confirmed empirically for example by Ilahi [14] for Pakistan, Mesnard [21, 22] and Mesnard and Ravallion [23] for Tunisia, Dustmann and Kirchkamp [10] for Turkey, or Woodruff and Zenteno [34] for Mexico. All these papers emphasize the high propensity of return migrants to self-select into self-employment upon return and their significant contribution to the creation of micro-enterprises and induced jobs at home. However, there are also studies pointing to more negative effects of remittances and migration on investment, be it because remittances are mainly consumed [28] , generate moral hazard problems leading to lower effort or labor force participation [4] or because migration may in some circumstances depress educational attainments of children [17] . 3 The empirical literature on the migration-inequality relationship does not offer decisive conclusions as to whether international migration in general, and migrants' remittances in particular, increase or decrease economic inequality at origin. This lack of consensus may be attributed to the diversity of the environments studied as well as to differences in the empirical approaches adopted: static versus dynamic models, with and without endogenous migration costs, and different conceptions about whether remittances must be treated as a substitute for domestic earnings (in which case the effect of migration on domestic income sources must also be taken into account). For example, Adams [1] found that international migration tends to increase economic inequality in rural Egypt, while the same author found a neutral effect in rural Pakistan [2] . In the case of rural Mexico, Taylor and Wyatt [33] showed that remittances are distributed almost evenly across income groups, hence inducing a direct equalizing effect in terms of economic inequality. In addition, they also showed that remittances have the highest shadow value for households at the middleto-low-end of the income distribution; for such households indeed, remittances ease access to productive assets (land) and/or complementary inputs; a second equalizing effect is thereby obtained. This suggests that the impact of remittances on rural development depends not only on the initial distribution of wealth in the origin community, but also on a host of factors affecting their shadow value (e.g., degree of liquidity of land rights, costs of complementary inputs, availability of local labor, etc.). In their study of remittances to a small coastal city of Nicaragua, Barham and Boucher [7] also find that remittances decrease income inequality, but only when domestic income sources are treated as exogenous; after constructing different nomigration counterfactuals to control for self-selection into migration and local laborforce participation, they show instead that remittances increase income inequality; this is explained by the fact that the potential home earnings of erstwhile migrants have a more equalizing effect on income distribution than remittances.
There is however a general sense that the impact of migration and remittances on economic inequality is likely to vary over time and needs not be monotonic. Stark et al. [31] suggested that the dynamics of remittances and inequality may be represented by an inverse U-shaped relationship along the lines described above. Their analysis was based on the decomposition of a Gini index of household income by income sources, taking into account the correlations between different income components. The method was applied to household data from two Mexican villages, one with a relatively recent Mexico-to-US migration experience, and one with a longer migration history. The distributional impact of remittances was shown to depend on the village's migration history, which implicitly captures the magnitude of migration costs. 4 They showed that income dispersion was decreased in both villages once migrants' remittances were taken into account, but more so in the village characterized by a longer migration tradition. With a similar approach applied to Yugoslavia, Milanovic [24] also tested for the possibility of such a trickle-down effect. Using data from the 1973, 1978 and 1983 Yugoslavian household surveys, Milanovic found no empirical support for this hypothesis: remittances were shown to raise income inequality throughout the period, and more so for agricultural households. Taylor [32] 's longitudinal study of a Mexican village also shows that remittances may well have an inequality-enhancing effect in the short-run and yet contribute to decreasing income inequality in the long-run as poor rural households gradually transform remittance income into productive assets.
Finally, McKenzie and Rapoport [18] examine the overall impact of migration on inequality in a large number of Mexican rural communities. They confirm that Mexican immigrants to the United States come from the middle of the asset wealth 4 Treating migration costs as exogenous may be adapted to situations where they mainly include transportation and border crossing expenditures, but is clearly unsatisfactory when information costs (e.g., search process for a destination, and a job at destination) are substantial; in this case, it is well known that migration costs tend to decrease as the size of the relevant network at destination increases. Such network effects have first been recognized in the sociological literature (e.g., [16] ) and, more recently, in the economic literature [8, 25] . distribution; meanwhile, the presence of migration networks, both at the family and at the community level, is found to increase the likelihood of migration. The underlying assumption is that international migration may be viewed as a diffusion process with decreasing information costs thanks to the role of migration networks: since migration costs are initially high in communities lacking migration experience, only households at the middle of the income and wealth distribution have both the incentives and the means to send members abroad; as these relatively affluent households benefit from additional remittance income, inequality at first increases; however, early migrants may supply information and assistance to future migrants from their hometown, thus making migration affordable to households at the lower end of the distribution and allowing for a decrease in inequality.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic theoretical framework that goes part of the way towards reconciling the conflicting results from empirical studies and complements the "networks" view in showing that the same predictions may be obtained with exogenous (i.e., constant) migration costs. We build on an important theoretical and empirical proposition of the migration literature, namely that migration and remittances are part of an implicit familial arrangement in a context of credit market imperfections [27, 30] . In such a context, we investigate the likely impact of migration on income and inequality both via the direct effect of migrants' households increasing their income via higher wages abroad and also the indirect effects of the outbound flow of individuals on the local labor market. We do so in a way that demonstrates the importance of the pre-migration distribution of wealth in determining the impact of migration on the dynamic path and long run levels of income and wealth inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we build a model with two classes of agents characterized by different non-liquifiable capital endowments, which result in different levels of productivity. In the rural regions, these endowments generally take the form of a plot of land, the quality and the quantity of which determine a household's agricultural productivity, as well as its income potential and migration incentives. Familial wealth is accumulated over time; it is saved from one generation's disposable income plus wealth and transmitted to the next generation. Obviously, migration incentives are stronger for poor households, but rich households are less constrained; as a result, the exact composition of migration flows in terms of economic endowment is a priori unclear. 5 In Sections 3 and 4, we first characterize different degrees of initial endowment disparities that condition the dynamics of migration and inequality in the migrants' origin communities. Then, we investigate how migration and remittances affect the evolution of wealth and income inequalities both at the beginning of transition and at the steady state. We show that migration and remittances always lower wealth inequality. In contrast, although income inequality is also reduced in the long run, it may either increase or decrease in the short run, depending on the initial distribution of endowments. That is to say, the short-and the long-run effects on the income distribution may be of opposite signs and display an inverse U-shaped relationship. In Section 5, we extend the model by introducing a local labor market into our agricultural economy. We still observe 5 Migrations decisions may also be affected by the level of information on foreign opportunities, which may be related to skills and income, or by incentive compatibility constraints (e.g., wealthy households have a stronger enforcement power to secure remittance through inheritance-see for example Hoddinott [13] ). These aspects are not dealt with in this paper. an inverse U-shaped relationship, but only in an originally impoverished economy when both types of households have very low levels of productivity. Moreover, with the presence of this inverse U-shaped curve, we find that migration and remittances are likely to increase the income inequality for good. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions.
The benchmark model
In this section, we lay out the basic framework of our model in the closed economy, that is, without access to migration. We consider a rural economy, where each household is engaged in self-sustaining agricultural production (i.e., no exchange of labor or goods). There are two classes of households: low-productivity (LP) and highproductivity (HP), whose difference originates from the quantity and quality of their inherited and non-liquifiable familial land. 6 These characteristics are captured by a technological parameter α, which equals to α for HP households and to α for LP households, with α > α > 1. Despite its productivity level, every household consists of the same given number of one-period-lived agents. Without loss of generality, this number, or the size of each household, is normalized to unity.
Next, we assume a quadratic production function for each family. 7 We write:
where l t ∈ [0, 1] is the amount of household labor used on own farm. The negative term captures the decreasing marginal productivity of labor. For mathematical convenience, it is assumed that the scale parameter α only affects the linear term.
Since we are primarily interested in the characterization of inter-household inequality and not in the intra-household distribution of income, we assume that the familial income is equally shared between the members of a given household. With homogeneous agents, each household maximizes its utility according to the following Cobb-Douglas function:
2 ), b t is the wealth inherited from the previous generation and b t+1 is the bequest left to the next generation. σ ∈ ]0, 1[ is the parameter indicating preferences 6 While we assume away a land (rental) market, a full development on the extension of land quality improvement is presented in Supplementary Material. In fact, it is not possible to explicitly model land quantity in our current setting. This is because we do not specify the quantity of land, but use α as a composite characteristic for both quality and quantity. 7 With a quadratic function, the marginal productivity of labor is bounded from above. This avoids unrealistic solutions where a very small proportion of household members stays in the familial farm with a very high marginal productivity. between consumption and bequests. Lastly, y t is the amount of household income. The usual utility maximization leads to
In a closed economy, there is no access to migration so that the sole source of familial income is the household agricultural production: y t = q t . 8 Given our utility function, the maximization of utility is equivalent to maximizing income. Since we assume that productivity levels of both types are greater than 1, we obtain l * t = 1 for both types of household (i.e., everybody works), and
we know there exists a unique and stable steady state for the linear function b t+1 (b t ). At the steady state,
Open economy: with access to migration
Let us now assume that after this rural society evolves into its steady state in the closed economy, for some exogenous and unexpected reason, there is a migration possibility to a high-wage foreign destination from period t = 1. 9 The foreign wage per migrant, w * , is given (i.e., the home country or region is small enough to keep wages at destination unaffected by migration). 10 Meanwhile, each migrant incurs a fixed and positive amount of migration costs denoted by c. Due to the absence of credit markets, migration costs must be financed at the beginning of each period with the family's accumulated wealth. The familial motivation for sending out migrants is to increase total family income, and thus household utility. Migration by some members is an implicit familial arrangement involving: (i) collective financing of migration costs, and (ii) remittances 8 In Section 5, we will introduce a local labor market, but for the time being, it is assumed that there is no exchange amongst households. 9 In fact, we can open the frontier at any period without altering our inequality analysis. Our assumption is made to facilitate the proofs of the propositions presented in Section 4. 10 The foreign wage is the same for all migrants because we assume that they are homogeneous agents. The difference in agricultural productivity between the HP and the LP household members comes from their inherited land and has nothing to do with agent-specific characters. from the migrants to the remaining household members. Note that we abstract from modelling the possibility for remittances to be invested in land or in any other productive asset. 11 This is because, in our theoretical setting, the economic impact of the investment in "migrants" works in the same direction (in terms of inequality) as the impact of investment in other productive assets. In our dynamic framework, previous migration flows allow households to accumulate wealth, which further increases the number of migrants they can afford. This gradual relaxation of credit constraint can be assisted by investment in land quality. As long as land quality investment is characterized by decreasing returns to scale, both greater access to migration and more investment in land are forces of convergence for inter-household inequality in the long-run. 12 Nevertheless, inequality in the short-run will be greatly affected by the degree of liquidity constraint, which is determined by the initial familial wealth, and by how fast the constraint can be relaxed, which depends on the rate of wealth accumulation that can be accelerated by remittances.
With these understandings, let m t be the number of migrants in HP households and m t for that in LP households. Each household is therefore subjected to a liquidity constraint as follows:
LP household's migration decision
We assume w * − c > α, or the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage is greater than the highest level of marginal productivity for the LP household. Hence, if there is no liquidity constraint, the LP household will choose to have all its family members migrating to earn foreign wages, (m nc t = 1). In order to avoid such unrealistic situations where a certain type of household fully disappears from the local economy, we impose the following condition: 13
which implies that, due to a binding liquidity constraint, there are always some members of the LP household who stay behind for the agricultural production. Therefore, their effective number of migrants is
The income of LP households now comes from agricultural production as well as from received foreign wage:
Based on our assumptions, we find that y t is strictly increasing in b t . This is an intuitive result which says that, when a LP household is less bound by the liquidity constraint, more family members will be able to work abroad, which generates a higher net reward than working on the familial farm.
Due to the change in sources of income, the decision rule of bequest is no longer linear in the bequeathed wealth, as shown in Section 2. Instead, it becomes a quadratic function:
Our assumptions indicate that (i) the function b t+1 (b t ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and (ii) b t+1 (0) is positive. 
Proof See Supplementary Material.
HP household's migration decision
With migration possibilities, the HP households face the following maximization problem: ∀t ≥ 1,
Using the Kuhn-Tucker formulation and excluding the situation where m * t = 1 (for the same reason as with the LP households), we obtain the migration rates respectively for the following scenarios.
First, when α ≥ 1 + w * − c, even the lowest level of marginal productivity on family farm (α − 1) is no less than the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage. Therefore, the HP households do not have any incentive to send abroad their family members:
Second, when α ≤ w * − c, the HP households face a similar situation as do the LP households. That is, since the highest level of marginal productivity α is no greater than the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage, the HP households have incentives to send out all family members. For the same reason as for the LP households, their liquidity constraint is assumed to be always binding (i.e., b t < c, ∀t ≥ 1). Thus,
the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage lies somewhere between the highest and the lowest levels of marginal productivity for the HP households. Hence, the HP households have an incentive to send out part of their family members, but not all. We find that, without liquidity constraint, the optimal number of migrants is m nc With the accumulation of family wealth, however, the HP households will be able to overcome the liquidity constraint at a certain period, when
In fact, whether a migration decision falls into one of these three settings is decided by the level of α.
[ , there are three types of migration decisions depending on α:
Since migration decisions alter a household's income level, which subsequently changes the dynamics of wealth accumulation, we can now use the above derived optimal rates of migration to categorize different cases of income and wealth dynamics.
In this case, m * t = 0, so the income and the wealth levels of the HP households remain at the steady state of the closed economy: ∀t ≥ 1,
(ii) Higher-Medium Inequality Case:
Based on our assumptions that (i) σ ∈ ]0, 1[ and (ii) b t+1 (b t = 0) > 0, there exists a unique and stable steady state of wealth, which is
(iii) Lower-Medium Inequality Case: α 0 ≤ α < α 1 In the beginning of this case, m * t = b t c , so both the income and wealth dynamics follow the same patterns as in the low inequality case that will be clarified below. However, as soon as the liquidity constraint is overcome and so m * t = 1 + w * − c − α, the dynamics switch to what have been described in the higher-medium inequality case.
(iv) Low Inequality Case: α < α 0
In this case, m * t = b t c . Hence,
Based on the same reasons as for Eq. 3, there exists a real-numbered stable steady state of wealth
and b m ss ∈ ]0, c[.
Remittances
As emphasized above, we focus in this paper on inter-household inequality rather than on intra-household inequality. For this reason, we assume an equal-sharing rule for family income, meaning that remittances sent per migrant are such that they equalize income per-member across migrants and non-migrants in a given household. Hence, the equilibrium amount of remittances is given by the difference between the average income of a household and the domestic income per member in the home region. Since migration costs are equally shared within a household, the amount received by each remaining member can be written as:
This is the product of two factors: the migration rate and the averaged-income gap between migrants and remaining HP household members.
Rewriting the general expression above for each case, we have for the LP
2c , and for the HP households, in the 1. High inequality case: r t = 0; 2. Higher-medium inequality case:
Lower-medium inequality case:
For households faced with binding liquidity constraints, it is observed that, with sufficiently high migration costs, the amount of remittances is increasing in the familial wealth bequeathed from the previous generation. 14 In the meantime, a higher amount of remittances implies more bequests for the next generation to finance migration costs. With this specific mechanism, while the degree of liquidity constraint is determined by a household's initial wealth, remittances help relax the constraint via intergenerational wealth transfers. In the next section, we will discuss how inter-household inequalities are affected by different rates of wealth accumulation, which can be accelerated by remittances.
The effect of migration and remittances on inter-household inequality
We have seen so far that migration to a high-wage destination enables rural households to raise their average income via (i) a rise in marginal productivity of labor for a given land quality, and (ii) remittances from migrated family members. This change in income subsequently alters the inter-household inequalities of income and of wealth. Below, we will characterize this alteration in the short and the long runs in each case, but before doing so, let us define the measures that we use to evaluate inter-household inequality: 15
Definition 2 Income Inequality:
From Eq. 1, we derive the wealth inequality at the steady state of the closed economy:
Similarly, we obtain the income inequality at the steady state of the closed economy:
14 Theoretically, it is possible to have negative remittances, i.e., r t < 0. In this case, it is the remaining household who subsidizes the migrant members because migration results in higher average returns on the domestic farm than overseas. In reality, however, it is more probable to have a non-negative level of remittances. If we would like to restrict our attention on cases with non-negative remittances, the sufficient condition is to impose high enough migration costs, or c > 1. With this condition, it can be easily shown that r t is strictly increasing and concave in b t in the case of binding liquidity constraint. The direct implication of higher migration costs is to reduce the net benefits of migration, which acts to slow down convergence in wealth and income in the later analysis of inequalities. The qualitative results, as stated in the propositions, remain the same independently of the amount of migration costs assumed. 15 Note that the wealth level at each period is chosen by the previous generation.
High inequality case
In this case, we can easily conclude that both income and wealth inequalities decrease whether in the short or the long run. This is because the HP households' income and wealth levels remain at the closed-economy steady state while the LP households gain greater income and wealth via remittances from family members working abroad. 
Other cases
In the higher-and the lower-medium inequality cases as well as the low inequality one, both types of households benefit from remittances sent back by family members working abroad. Therefore, the effects on inequalities are not as clear-cut as in the high inequality case. However, we find that all these three cases generate the same properties in terms of inequality, despite the fact that the proofs of these properties differ greatly from case to case.
Proposition 2 (Effects on the income inequality)
In the higher-medium, the lowermedium, and the low inequality cases, it is uncertain whether the income inequality rises or reduces in the short run, i.e., Therefore, in the cases where income inequality rises in the short run, our model generates the inverse U-shaped pattern between migration/remittances and inequality, the same end result described by the migration network theory. However, we need not endogenize migration costs in order for the disadvantaged households to overcome their liquidity constraints. Instead, they do so simply via intergenerational wealth accumulation. As shown in the proofs for Proposition 2, we find that the closer α goes toward the subsistence level of consumption, the more likely we will have this inverse U-shaped relationship. 16 Figure 1 best illustrates the reasons behind.
This figure shows the income and the wealth dynamics in a low-inequality example, with the LP productivity set to a very low level. In the beginning of the open economy, due to the absence of a credit market, the LP households are severely constrained by their little familial wealth due to their very low agricultural production, which forces them to devote almost all resources to surviving at the subsistence level. Thus, unlike their wealthier HP counterparts who can already capitalize to a large extent on the access to migration, the LP households are only able to send out few migrants to earn the high foreign wage. Consequently, income inequality rises. Moreover, remittances contribute to more wealth for the HP households in the next period and help them to rapidly relax the liquidity constraint. In contrast, the LP households' inability to finance migration costs for more members results in a meager inflow of remittances; therefore, their rate of wealth accumulation is much lower in the short run, which prevents most of the LP households from working abroad for higher income. In more technical terms, the HP households' income quickly converges toward its open-economy steady state whereas the speed of convergence is by far slower for the LP households. This is exactly what causes the bump of income inequality in Fig. 2 . Later on, while the increase in income becomes negligible for the HP households, the LP households have accumulated more wealth to relax their liquidity constraint. Hence, they become more and more capable of sending migrants abroad to raise the household income level. Finally, even though wealth accumulation also slows down for the LP households, the catch-up continues due to the difference in their speeds of convergence to the respective steady states. That is why after some point we observe a continuing decline in income inequality.
The same reasoning also applies to the lower-and the higher-medium inequality cases for the possible rise in income inequality in the short run. In the lower-medium inequality case, the short-run dynamics is identical to that in the low inequality case, and in the higher-medium inequality case, the HP households' income jumps to the 17 The parameter values are chosen to satisfy the model assumptions. In particular, migration cost c is sufficiently large to impose the liquidity constraint (at least) on the low productivity household in the beginning of an open economy, and the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage w * − c is sufficiently large to induce out-migration (at least) in the low productivity household. In Fig. 1 , the distance between α and α is made to fit the low-inequality case. new steady state as soon as the frontier is open whereas the LP households are not yet able to benefit much in the beginning. 18
Corollary 1
In an economy without local labor market, migration and remittances are most likely to generate an inverse U-shaped pattern in terms of income inequality when (i) the LP household is sufficiently poor in the closed economy, and (ii) the initial inequality is not too high so that HP households have incentives to send out at least some migrants. 19 In contrast, thanks to migration and remittances, we observe a constant decline of wealth inequality in Fig. 2 .
Proposition 3 (Effects on the wealth inequality)
In the higher-medium, the lowermedium, and the low inequality cases, migration and remittances reduce the wealth inequality in both the short and the long runs as in the high inequality case, i.e., b 2 < b 1 and b ss < b 1 ∀ α. 18 We may consider the possibility of investing savings overseas. Let us suppose that there exists a foreign capital market, and in the open economy, bequests can be invested abroad at a positive interest rate (i.e., the liquidity constraint becomes m t ≤ (1 + r)b t /c where r > 0 is the foreign interest rate). This will speed up the wealth-inequality reducing effect of migration. In the meantime, it will also speed up convergence in income since the liquidity constraint, i.e., using bequests to finance migration costs, is relaxed at a faster rate. Moreover, investments abroad will reinforce the inverse U-shaped relationship, if it exists, because the LP household starts with little wealth in the beginning of the open economy. Hence, in the short run, the possibility to invest savings abroad benefits more the HP household. 19 As a robustness check, we also construct the Gini coefficient that takes into account the subsequent population changes due to migration:
and ρ > 0 is the number of LP households per HP household (see Supplementary  Material) . Figure 4 in the Supplementary Material, which corresponds to the same scenario as Fig. 2 and with ρ = 1.5, shows that the inverse U-shaped relationship may still exist with this alternative measure.
The reason why the evolution of wealth inequality may be different from that of income inequality, particularly in the short run, is due to the subsistence of consumption (x m ). As discussed above, the inverse U-shaped pattern of income inequality requires that the LP household has very low productivity such that the initial wealth of the LP households is only slightly above zero, for that most of the LP income is spent on subsistence. Thus, based on our definition of the wealth inequality:
, the initial ratio of wealth ( b 1 ) is very high. Moreover, as long as in the following period, the increase in the wealth of the HP household is proportionally less than the increase in the wealth of the LP household, wealth inequality decreases despite the absolute difference is increased. Figure 1 presents such an example: although the absolute difference in wealth is apparently increased in the initial periods, the ratio of wealth is decreased as shown in the corresponding Fig. 2 . We could of course also measure the inter-household inequality in terms of utility. Due to our Cobb-Douglas setting, the utility-inequality ratio equals to the wealth-inequality ratio ( u t = ut u t = b t ). Hence, as concluded in Proposition 3, the utility inequality is reduced in all cases, whether in the short or the long run.
Extension: local labor market
In this section, we introduce general equilibrium effects in the form of a local labor market into our agricultural economy. The LP households may choose to work on the HP farm if the wage rate offered (w t ) is higher than their marginal productivity on own farm. As a result, both households enjoy higher income and thus higher wealth when compared to an economy without labor exchange; nevertheless, changes in inequalities are not a priori clear. Hence, we would like to investigate below: i) whether there is still an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and income inequality over time; ii) whether long-run income inequality always falls below the closed-economy level, as observed in the economy without local labor market.
Closed economy
For HP households, the income maximization problem in the closed economy becomes
which gives the labor demand (n d t ) condition:
Similarly, LP households maximize their income according to
(1 − n s t ) 2 2 + w t n s which gives the labor supply (n s t ) condition:
Let us assume that there are ρ LP households per HP household, with ρ > 0. Therefore, at the labor market equilibrium, n * t = n s t = n d t /ρ. Using the labor demand and supply conditions, we find that, if the HP productivity (α) is not too much higher than the LP productivity (α) and/or if the LP population is relatively large, then only some of the LP household members work on the HP farm and the equilibrium wage rate is lower than α. Otherwise, all LP members work on the HP farm and receive a wage at least as high as the LP households' highest marginal productivity α. In short, the two possible labor market equilibria, denoted as CS and CA respectively, are:
[CS] when α < 1 + ρ + α,
[CA] when α ≥ 1 + ρ + α,
Since the labor market equilibrium in the closed economy is time-invariant, the income and the wealth inequalities at the steady state are
with (n * t , w t ) being the CS or the CA labor market equilibrium.
Open economy: with access to migration
From our discussion on the open economy without labor exchange, we have learned that when the HP productivity is so high that α ≥ 1 + w * − c, the HP households do not send out any migrants and inequalities must fall whether in the short-or the long-run. Hence, in this section we restrict our attention within α < 1 + w * − c such that m t = 0. As before, we enforce the condition m t = 1; that is, the HP household is always constrained if α < w * − c.
As soon as the frontier is open at t = 1, the HP household's maximization problem becomes
which gives the labor demand condition
For the LP households, we maintain the assumption that they are always liquidity constrained (m t = b t c ∈ ] 0, 1 [), such that at least part of the LP household will stay behind for agricultural production, whether on own farm or on the HP farm. They maximize income according to
which gives the labor supply condition
Similar to the closed economy, there are two possible labor market equilibria. In the first one, denoted as OS, some of the remaining LP family members work for the HP households, and in the second one, denoted as OA, everyone who remains behind works on the HP farm. Listed below are the equilibrium amounts of exchanged labor and their corresponding wage rates.
For the equilibrium [OS], which applies when α ≤ (1 − m t ) + ρ 1 − b t c + α: 
How does the local labor market equilibrium change in response to migration?
if the labor market equilibrium in the closed economy is CA, where α ≥ 1 + ρ + α, then after opening to migration, the equilibrium must change to OA. In other words, if everybody works on the HP farm before migration becomes a possibility, then afterward, all the remaining LP members will still work for the HP households. Otherwise, when the closedeconomy equilibrium is CS, it may change to either OS or OA in the short run. With less and less labor supply as the LP household sends out increasing number of migrants, the equilibrium may maintain within the same type, or start at OS and end up at OA in the long run. Hence, even if productive in the closed economy, the LP farm may be abandoned permanently after migration becomes possible.
The income and the wealth inequalities in the open economy are therefore:
with (n * t , w t ) being the OS or the OA labor market equilibrium.
Evolution of inter-household inequalities
In order to answer the questions that we raised in the beginning of this section: i) is there still an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and income inequality over time? and ii) does long-run income inequality always fall below the closedeconomy level? we resort to numerical simulation using Eqs. 5, 6, 7, and 8. We fix x m = 2, c = 1.5, w * = 7.5 with three different values of ρ so that we create three scenarios where the LP population can be smaller (ρ = 0.5), equal (ρ = 1), or larger (ρ = 1.5) than their HP counterpart. In addition, we experiment with different values of α, and we vary σ and α within the ranges that satisfy our assumptions. We find that, after introducing a local labor market, we may still observe the inverse U-shaped pattern. Recall that without labor market, the condition for observing such a pattern was that α must be close enough to the subsistence consumption level x m . In fact, the existence of a Kuznets curve now requires α to be even closer to it. Additionally, it also requires that α is sufficiently low, or not too much higher than α. This acts to minimize the positive effect of labor exchange on the LP household's income: with lower productivity, the HP household offers lower wage and hires less LP workers. 20 Under such circumstances, the LP household is very much constrained in the beginning to benefit from the access to migration.
Corollary 2
In an economy with a local labor market, migration and remittances are most likely to generate an inverse U-shaped pattern in an originally impoverished community, where both the LP and the HP households are living close to the subsistence level before migration becomes possible.
More importantly, we find that with a Kuznets curve, income inequality falls but may not fall below the closed-economy level in the long-run (see Fig. 3a ). In other words, access to migration may increase the income inequality for good, which is a very different result from Proposition 2. The reason is that, with labor exchange, the HP households incur lower opportunity costs of migration than without: they are able to, at least partly, compensate for their loss of labor by employing the LP family members for their agricultural production. In contrast, although the LP household also benefits from migration and labor exchange, the gains are limited due to a tight liquidity constraint and low equilibrium wage rates. 21 Proposition 4 (Increased income inequality in the long run) With the existence of a local labor market, when α is sufficiently close to α, the income inequality is increased in the long run, i.e., y 0 < y ss .
The last interesting note is that migration and remittances are not always Paretoimproving in an economy with a local labor market. When the HP household's productivity is so high that they do not benefit much from migration opportunities, the opening of frontier actually makes them worse off because the equilibrium wage rate hikes up due to decreasing labor supply. These decreases in HP household's absolute income and wealth can be observed in Fig. 3c .
Conclusion
The dynamic framework proposed in this paper demonstrates that the impact of migration and remittances on inequalities in the migrants' origin communities largely depends on the difference in their initial endowments of non-liquifiable capital. These endowments translate into different productivity levels and in turn determine migration incentives and opportunities, and they also affect the exact way in which remittances and labor markets respond to migration. Combined together, the global effects eventually determine the intergenerational transmission of wealth across households. Note that while the results were shown to be robust to the inclusion of risk-aversion, 22 foreign savings, and possible investments in land quality, the model remains quite specific as it assumes that liquidity constraints are binding for at least some categories of households along the process of development. This is in contrast to previous dynamic models of migration and occupational choice (e.g., [20, 26] ), which allow for dynamic paths with potentially full intergenerational mobility. 23 The 21 Even though equilibrium wage rates go up with migration due to rising demand and reduction in supply, the increases are small because the HP household also has a very low level of productivity. 22 The results with risk-aversion are available from the authors upon request. 23 Our assumptions that liquidity constraints remain binding for LP households is made so that at no point in time will the LP household migrate completely from the origin. It is sufficient but not necessary for our results to hold (and, in addition, it makes computations much easier). Actually, the LP household's productivity could be slightly higher than currently imposed as long as the liquidity constraint is binding at least in the short-run. specificity of our model also comes from the assumption of a subsistence level with regard to consumption. This is translated into diminutive intergenerational wealth transfers in the short run, for households with very low agricultural productivity. In other words, subsistence consumption greatly restricts the rate of wealth accumulation. Thus, for impoverished families who have their basic needs barely satisfied, the degree of liquidity constraint remains high for a longer time.
The main results of the analysis may be summarized as follows. First, whether in the short or the long runs, migration and remittances always reduce wealth inequality, through a proportionally larger increase in wealth for the poor. This is not necessarily true though for income inequality. Indeed, except when the inequality in productivity is sufficiently high, income inequality may decrease continuously over time or be characterized by a "trickle-down" transition path. In the latter case, income inequality rises in the short-run and then subsides after some period of time. That is to say, an inverse U-shaped relationship may be generated via intergenerational wealth transfers. We find that this case is most likely to occur when low-productivity households are sufficiently poor in the economy without labor exchange, or when both low-and high-productivity households are rather indigent in a closed economy with local exchange. Third, in the long run, migration and remittances are shown to decrease income inequality in an economy without labor exchange. However, when a local labor market exists and the income inequality is increased in the short run, the deepened inequality may never recover to its closedeconomy level, when migration was not possible.
The first two results imply that migration network effects are not a necessary condition for observing an inverse U-shaped pattern, and they have strong implications for the empirical analysis of the migration-inequality relationship. An immediate implication is that domestic income sources should be treated as endogenous, as advocated for example by Adams [1] , Taylor [32] , or Barham and Boucher [7] . Indeed, our results suggest that studies based on Gini Index decompositions with exogenous distributions of domestic incomes may yield biased estimates of the inequality impact of migration, with the direction of the bias being theoretically uncertain and depending on the initial distribution of wealth. This also suggests that the lack of consensus in the empirical literature on the inequality impact of migration may be partly explained by the omission of labor market responses. Indeed, in a country such as Mexico where inequality is high by international standards, this omission is likely to lead to an underestimation of the inequality-reducing effect of migration, but not to a reversal of the sign of the effect. By contrast, in a country such as Yugoslavia where inequality is much lower, taking labor market responses into account could possibly reverse the conclusions on the inequality-enhancing effect of remittances [24] . Of course, such differences could also be due to the fact that societies are observed at different points of their dynamic paths, or simply to methodological differences as discussed in the introduction. Finally, our model suggests that the usual hypothesis of migrant network effects must be tested for directly rather than inferred from the observation of lower inequality levels within communities with a longer migration tradition. Indeed, as explained, our framework generates the possibility of an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration/remittances and inequality. This is consistent with the findings of the related empirical literature, but offers a different explanation based on the dynamic accumulation of wealth across generations, with no need to endogenize migration costs through network effects. 24 24 Our model suggests that the inverse U-shaped pattern between income inequality and remittances/migration can be generated with constant migration costs, while the hypothesis of migrant networks leads to the same prediction with decreasing costs in the network size. Therefore, the unconstrained optimal migration rates in our model are constant while the actual rates are lower but increasing over time when a household is faced with a binding liquidity constraint. In contrast, the network hypothesis suggests that the optimal unconstrained migration rates can increase as well overtime when the network size grows. Hence, assuming that some migration takes place and some households are not credit constrained, it cannot be the case in models as ours where all the "action" is on the credit constraints side that the more affluent households increase the number of their migrant members over time. More generally, with such models, we expect the rate of increase in the number of migrants to be greatest for households at the lower end of the migrant households' wealth distribution. These are two discriminative tests of models with credit constraints/exogenous migration costs versus models of migrant networks/endogenous migration costs. In addition and more specifically, our model predicts that an inverse U-shaped pattern in the relationship between migration and inequality is most likely to occur in a context of initially low income and low inequality. Still, our purpose is not to deny the relevance of the network hypothesis, but rather to emphasize the possible confounding effects of networks and of wealth transmission in the dynamics of migration and inequality.
